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92 students from a Southern California liberal arts college and two Beijing
universities participated in an online questionnaire. Their cultural tendencies (i.e. level of
collectivism and perception of family support) and responses to hypothetical investment
scenarios were observed. Participants were asked to provide the amount they would
invest in each scenario as well as a risk safety rating. The Chinese respondents reported
higher cushion and collectivism scores than the Americans. Furthermore, the Chinese
sample offered more money for the three riskiest scenarios; they also rated three
scenarios safer than the Americans did. The cushion and collectivism scores were not
found to predict risk appraisal and amount invested in the scenarios. The results suggest
that cultural biases may have an impact on the financial risk-taking behavior of different
peoples, but other cultural variables and situational determinants may play an equally
influential role in affecting risk perception and investment behavior.
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We live in a globalized and increasingly complex world, overloaded with advice
on how to deal with risk. In essence, almost all decisions involve uncertainty because
they pertain to future events, and risk is often the critical unknown variable. To
accommodate, we utilize cognition and emotions to calculate risk. From choosing the
right graduate school to outlining a wise 401K while working abroad, we face a
tremendous diversity in risk. As the world becomes flatter and cities diversify in culture
and ethnicity, perceptions and reaction to risk have far-reaching implications for societies
that are frequented with visitors from a variety of cultures. The present study investigates
the presence of systematic cross-cultural differences in risk perception and preference.
This topic is of both theoretical and practical significance; its empirical results build upon
studies on interpretation of risk attitudes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and cross-cultural
behavior (Triandis, 1993). The findings provide key support for the assertion of a positive
and active relationship between certain cultural traits (i.e. family support, close
interpersonal relationships, and financial prudence).
In the last two decades, cross-cultural psychology and risky decision-making
behavior have respectively gained higher profiles in psychology. The rise in popularity of
these two topics is unsurprising, given the increase in cross-cultural interactions resulting
from the economic and political ascendancy of China and other developing nations.
When high-stake negotiations take place between the West and the rest of the world,
differing cultural interpretation of risk can have a crucial impact on decision outcomes.
However, only a few researchers have conceptualized and examined the intersection of
culture and risky decision-making. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) stressed the important
influence of culture on both the perception of risk and its acceptability across discrete
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individuals. Unfortunately, the bulk of research in cross-cultural perception, acceptance,
and reaction to risk has merely assumed national differences in behavior and cultural
profiles. For example, when researchers find differences in perceived risk for the same
given scenario for a group of Chinese and Americans, they rely on a rather common
sense explanation in the discussion. Their rationale is that since China has always been
known to be an extremely collectivistic nation-culture, the observed differences can be
attributed to the independent variable (nationality-membership). The underlying
processes that may explain cross-cultural differences in risk preference, perception, and
interpretation are not included in the majority of cross-cultural risk research. Research
based on theoretical models that can explain and expand upon current cross-cultural
research is needed. Construction of the paradigm should reflect the link between culture
and risk. Specifically, there ought to be particular attention on cultural variables such as
collectivism and individualism on individuals’ interpretation and evaluation of risk
(Triandis, 1993). As a person encounters a potentially risky situation, his attitudes and
beliefs—heavily influenced by culture—serve as a guiding anchor for his reactions. To
construct a model-based examination of the culture-risk relationship, one must explore
the underlying processes and extensive literature that delineate distinct cultural
dimensions and risk behavior.

Risk
There is an extensive literature in both psychology and economics that has
analyzed and defined risk, but a classic study provides the comprehensive and novel
exposition of the concept. Economists Kahneman and Tversky (1979) applied their
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exceptional Prospect Theory to better understand and outline the processes of human risk
behavior. Their overarching proposal is that risk aversion is the predominant reaction to
risk. As individuals begin their appraisal of the possible gains and losses of risky
situations, they choose the option that has the prospect of highest value. This value is a
derivative of either discounting (uncertainty of gain or probability in potential losses) or
premiums (desirability of certain gains). In other words, there exists an overarching
utilitarian construct that guides individual appraisal and reaction to risky situations. For
most of the population, the predominant risk behavior is risk aversion: generally
consistent preference for sure or highly probable gains to a loss of equal expected value.
A loss for example, carries a steeper discount than the premium given for gains. In
addition, certainty intensifies the averseness of losses and the desirability of gains.
Consequently, individuals are risk-seeking in losses and risk-averse in gains; we want to
avoid a sure loss as much as possible while clinging on to definite gains. Kahneman and
Tversky titled the behaviors as the “certainty effect” and the “reflection effects”, or loss
aversion. The sharp discrepancy between weights attached to sure gains/losses and
probable gains/losses are especially prominent in managerial and major decision-making
processes. The researchers assert that when the choice becomes more debatable, prudence
will favor certainty effect among managers. Furthermore, people are naturally reluctant to
accept responsibility when there is a loss, thus a small increase in probability of an
unfavorable outcome is sharply discounted. In addition, decision makers become more
risk averse when they expect their choices to be reviewed by others (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). Thus, the emphasis of risk behavior and perception theory is that
individuals do not use a rational approach to approach and react to risk.
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Decades after his original research, Kahneman laid out a more thorough construal
of risk aversion. He suggested that human beings have unjustified optimism and
unreasonable risk aversion (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). The mechanism behind the
behavior is a “narrow decision frame”: decisions are considered in singularity, often
isolating the current scenario from other choices that may be pending in the future. Thus,
people have a propensity to anchor forecast on a distinct scenario rather than past results,
leading to over-optimism. The inability to pool risks also renders individuals overly timid
since they view a single risky prospect as extreme. According to this view, risk appraisal
is more of an intuitive process than a rational one. The persistent avoidance of variance
and variability distorts our analytical thinking when it comes to risk perception,
evaluation, and response.
Concurrent to the work of Kahneman and Tversky, Markowitz (1959) developed
an original quantitative conceptualization of risk behavior. Although he is primarily an
expert in corporate finance, Markowitz presented an insightful analysis of human
decision-making in general, with special regards to the treatment of uncertainty
(Markowitz, 1952). He believed that individuals viewed risk as a compromise between
the choice’s return-value (V) and its risk (R) and assumed that decision makers seek to
minimize the risk of a portfolio. Markowitz proposed that people’s willingness to pay
(WTP) for an investment is a function of its value, risk rating, and its b coefficient which
indicates individual preferences for a given level of risk. This coefficient serves as a key
weighting variable that accounts for the impact of cultural biases as discussed later in the
study.
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WTP (X) = f (V(X), R(X)) = V(X) – bR(X)
The equation describes Willingness to Pay as being influenced by the amount of
utility value V(X) minus Risk R(X). V(X) simply represents how much an option is
worth to the individual facing the decision. For example, if an individual is browsing a
real estate magazine for a potential investment in a home, the price tag of the listed
property is the V(X). The b coefficient is an evaluation of risk preference; for the same
given level of Risk, individuals may have different attitudes and subsequent behavior.
Some people may inherently prefer a higher-variance option over a lower-variance option
of equal expected value because they have a positive attitude towards risk. An example: a
downtown Detroit condo is listed at $250,000. The downtrodden nature of the city and its
economy renders a high risk value R(X), which means that there is some significant
probability that the property will decline in value V(X). However, if an individual
investor likes to take chances, he or she would have a lower b, or a higher tolerance for
increased risk that discounts the inherent risk value R(X). This in turn would temper the
risk aversion intrinsic in most risk perception and behavioral conditions. Subsequently,
the Willingness to Pay for this project would be higher than another person with a lower
risk tolerance.
The Markowitz theory also has important implications with regards to the
potential to maximize utility from cooperation and “trading” risks. An understanding of
the risk appraisal process and its variability across different individuals enable more
accurate predictions of opponents during negotiation and of partners in collaborations.
For example, if two parties from the United States and Korea have stalled during a
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negotiation of a business opportunity, it may be that they view the same investment
equally in terms of value but different in terms of Risk R(X). Or, the parties may view the
investment similarly in value and risk but one side may simply be more risk-averse
(different in b). If the differences in perception of R(X) are the driving force behind the
impediment, then an effective solution should involve exploration of more cognitive,
rational methods so that WTPa (X) = WTPb (X). For instance, monetary compensation
through side payments or contractual modifications might work best to address
differences in R(X). On the other hand, differences in risk preference (b) may be
addressed by appealing to affective responses and emotions, since it would be more
difficult to logically persuade someone to change their longtime personal preferences for
risk. This example shows that the path toward efficient risk appraisal and problemsolving depends crucially on knowing how different individuals view components of risk.
In real life, individuals often do not conform to the theoretical frameworks
projected by Markowitz or Kahneman. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1986) found
that people’s perceptions of risks of hazards often have little to do with possible
outcomes and probabilities. Instead, individuals harbor systematic biases—such as
overweighing risk associated with infrequent and catastrophic events and discounting the
risk of familiar activities. Furthermore, cultural frameworks can lead to systematic bias
that predisposes individuals to react and perceive risk in a certain manner.

Culture
One of the most significant differences among people is their cultural background.
Research in cross-cultural differences has been steadily growing in quantity, mainly due
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to the remarkable number of interactions between the major economic powers. Research
on cultural profiles, however, dates far before the rise of China, India, and globalization.
From theoretical perspectives to field research of cultural products, such as advertising,
work style, and child-rearing, psychologists find persistent differences in the way
different cultures adapt to and change the world around them.
The definition of culture has been controversial. Although there exists an
overabundance of variations, most academics tend to agree that culture requires the
presence of shared elements—whether they are attitudes, expectations, language, political
structure, or norms—and the transmission from one generation to the next
(Triandis, 1993). The study of cultural differences aims to identify cultural profiles in
which peoples are more or less similar in values and behavior. In essence, a cultural
profile consists of an arrangement of shared culture organized around a central theme
identifiable in a geographic region or specific group.
The current study observes the cultural influences on risk perception and
preference for individuals from China and the United States, which are two nations that
have some of the most dissimilar cultural profiles. Specifically, the United States is
regarded as one of the most individualistic cultures; whereas, China is a prototypical
example of a historically collectivistic culture (Tse et al., 1988; Oyserman, Coon, &
Kemmelmeier, 2002). Two pioneer cross-cultural psychologists, Hofstede (1980) and
Triandis (1972; 1993) gathered valuable data that spanned across continents and made
insightful conclusions regarding the cultural chasm between collectivism and
individualism.
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On a broader scale, collectivism is organized around the importance of the
collective—family, co-workers, tribe, nationality, and race (Triandis, 1996). In contrary,
individualism primarily focuses on the role of the individual in social life. However, a
more comprehensive definition of collectivism and individualism requires analysis of the
antecedents, defining attributes, and consequences of such cultural profiles.
In general, there appears to be a gradual shift from collectivism to individualism
in many parts of the world. Affluence is found to be the strongest determinant of this
change in cultural orientation. Hofstede (1980) found correlations of .80 between the
“individualism” of a nation and gross national product per capita. As a key antecedent to
individualism, affluence is generally associated with industrialization and social
complexity. The resulting diversity of occupations, functions, and organizations offers
individuals more opportunities to venture farther than their predecessors in traditional
agrarian societies. One instance, the socioeconomic ascendancy of peoples has increased
access to individualistic, Western mass media. Certain norms, such as marrying for love
or pleasure rather than family duty and entrepreneurship have been absorbed by formerly
collectivistic societies. In essence, however, the most fundamental impetus of affluence is
the reduction of the relevancy for group goals. In collectivistic societies, individuals
depended upon the group arrangement for welfare; food, shelter, and survival were most
facilitated by group cooperation. With globalization and the subsequent job and education
opportunities, literacy rates and language aptitude of many previously agrarian societies
have had exceptional growth. As a result, many men and women have found novel ways
to support themselves through pursuing education and exploring the world beyond their
homesteads (Triandis, 1993).
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In addition to wealth, social and geographic mobility also contribute to
individualism; congregations of international peoples create hubs of heterogeneity in
norms and language. With the unprecedented reach of international students and
businesspeople, people from even remote areas of the globe have been interacting with
strangers from other cultures. As a result, the monolithic dominance of a single set of
values has been gradually tempered. Lastly, the economic organization of a nation also
influences the degree of individualism. For instance, capitalism and free markets often
breed individuals who compete fiercely to rise up in a stratified society. Globalization
exposes the domestic populace of a collectivistic nation to the trappings of individual
success, fame, and material abundance.
Collectivism is usually found in more homogenous societies that have a history of
relative isolation. In these societies, the majority of population rarely travels extensively
outside the epicenter, and outsiders are held with certain suspicion and reservation.
Furthermore, this cultural profile is more common in societies that are more
economically undeveloped. For example, agriculture is often found to be the dominant
economy in collectivistic groups. Consequently, large families and communal sharing—
traits of collectivism-- are essential for survival in agrarian societies.
Despite the preponderance of values and norms that distinguish collectivism and
individualism, the defining attributes outlined by Triandis (1993) and Traindis, McCusker,
and Hui (1990) are relevant for judging cultural differences in risk behavior. Generally
speaking, individualism is very high in the United States, Britain, and Western Europe.
Contrasting collectivism is the main orientation in Africa, Asia, and Latin America
(Triandis, McCusker, and Hui, 1990).

Cross-Cultural Risk Behavior 13

Meaning of the Self and Perception of Others. Collectivists see themselves as an
integral component of their larger group. Thus, identification in collectivism is mostly a
derivative of the collective character. Triandis (1990) found that when asked to complete
sentences that began with “I am…”, collectivists often gave answers that refer to a
group—for example, “I am a son, I am a Roman Catholic” etc. Individualists place much
more value on autonomy and uniqueness, responding with more individual characteristic
responses, such as “I am caring” or “I am a pilot.”
Observations by Lebra (1984) provide revealing portraits of the differences in
self-identification between collectivists and individualists. When Lebra (1984) worked on
compositions of life histories of Americans and Japanese, the Americans predominantly
used the self as the figure and all other information as “the background.” When she
interviewed the Japanese women, most of the information was regarding relationships
and almost nothing about the idiosyncrasies of the self. It is also likely that collectivists,
for all of their focus on group other than the individual members, perceive groups as
more homogeneous than do individualists. Iwao (1993) found that the Japanese are more
likely to perceive the opposite sex as more homogeneous than do Americans, a fact that
Iwao asserted as having some implication for the divergent divorce rates of the two
nations. A spouse who is dissatisfied with her husband is less likely to want a divorce if
she attributes the undesirable traits to characteristics of the gender category rather than
personal attributes. In other words, individualistic individuals are more likely to engage
in fundamental attribution error and undervalue or ignore the latent reasons behind the
actions of an individual. Collectivists are more likely to assume that the person engaging
in a certain behavior is doing so because of his or her membership to a certain group.
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Structure of Goals. If there is a discrepancy between the individual and group goal,
collectivists defer to the in-group directive. Role relevant goals contribute one of the
main fabrics of goal-setting in a collectivistic society. For example, individuals living in a
collectivistic society would assume a multitude of roles and pursue role-dependent goals
that facilitate that specific relationship or domain. For instance, social loafing occurs with
increased frequency among idiocentric or individualistic peoples. Earley (1989) found
that when a person’s output is not clearly tangible and detectable by others, if there are n
people doing an additive job (e.g. digging a ditch), the output is commensurate to the n
size and subsequently reduced. Earley did not observe this “social loafing” among
collectivists in China when they worked together; the internalized social norms regarding
the importance of the final group outcome contributed toward the equivalent per capita
output. Thus, as long as the task is important and meaningful to the group and that the
group is important, collectivistic individuals would be more likely to work hard in
performing their allocated duty without regard to the visibility of their per capita
contribution.
One of the most distinctive features of collectivism is the distribution of resources
to in-group members. In sharp contrast to the products of individualistic societies (i.e.,
capital markets, banks, and private property), collectivist communities often have a
shared fund to be allotted to each member based on equity in need (Triandis, 1995). For
example, Korean villages and Chinese villages often have a village “pot” that will receive
contribution from each member monthly. Then, at the end of the month, the family that
has the more dire need of the money is eligible to the entire fund for discretionary
purposes. Trust is endowed upon all because the pot is seen as a community goal
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furthering harmony and support. Thus, the individual is treated as a contributor toward
the larger social goals of the community; in return, he or she is entitled to the support of
the collective goal.

Behavior as a function of norms. Individualists experience cognitive dissonance when
they conform to the group norm but feel different internally. They habitually give more
weight to attitudes as determinants of social behavior. In contrast, collectivists experience
far less dissonance and refer to norms when interacting in society. The reason being is
that social norm acceptance is a hallmark trait of the collectivistic individual. As a result,
collectivist cognition is more context dependent, and communication is a derivative of
the immediate social environment and tends to be more indirect (Triandis, 1995). If one
has been to a gathering of Chinese families at a restaurant, the common occurrence would
be the fighting for the bill near the end of the meal. (These fights could become rather
intense.) It is not that every discrete Chinese family is magnanimous or eager to
demonstrate wealth; collectivistic Chinese individuals gauge the situation and refer to the
cultural norm – such as fighting for the bill – as guidance for the appropriate action.

Relationship Functions. Individualists have a much more rational approach to social
relationships. They often utilize a cost-benefit analysis when deciding to stay or exit an
existing relationship; the treatment of social capital is almost entirely instrumental
(Triandis, 1993). For instance, a highly individualistic approach to relationships is the
network map (as taught by some major organizational behavior courses): one is to label
each and every acquaintance and friend by their occupation and draw lines to indicate
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level of association. Then, network analysis is performed to analyze the overall
“efficiency” of one’s relationships; the suggestion is to maintain periphery-level contact
with each “type” of occupation to maximize utility of one’s networks. In contrast,
collectivists believe in life-long relationships that are founded upon family, community,
and reciprocity. The expectation that one’s family or circle of friends would assist in
times of difficulty remains a strong source of pride and emphasis amongst collectivists. In
addition, collectivists often engage in practices that ensures the survivability and
prosperity of one’s close associates. In a study that included Canadian, Hong Kong, and
Chinese executives, Tse, Lee, Vertinsky, and Wehrung (1988) observed the actual
business decisions made by these individuals in their international and domestic markets.
The Chinese and Hong Kong businessmen’s values of saving face, long-term exchange
relationships, restricted competition, and conservative views are well reflected in their
recorded market entry and product placement decisions.
It is worth noting, however, that all of us carry both individualistic and collectivist
tendencies. Predispositions can be activated by different situations. Trafimow, Triandis,
and Goto (1991) demonstrated that individuals can be made temporarily collectivist or
individualist in the laboratory setting. The participants were asked to list factors that
made them different from or similar with their family members and friends. There was a
significant effect of this manipulation with regards to the type of responses elicited from
the participants in the subsequent test of collectivism/individualism. The American
students gave 7% collective self-responses after receiving “think of what makes you
different” instructions, whereas the same students gave 23% collective self-responses
when primed with “think of what makes you similar” questions. Hence, the concept of
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individualism-collectivism is a concept based on a spectrum, not a dichotomous entity.
When a particular group membership important to an individual is threatened, all humans
have the capability to become collectivists. For example, when the United States was
attacked on September 11th, the surge in patriotism, collectivism, and group-norm
thinking was highly visible. As such, there is no fundamental reason to assume an
inherent connection or discontinuity between individual and collective representations of
these themes; it is important to recognize that each culture allows for individual variation.
Cultural profiles establish a host of consequences ranging from socialization of
children, proper nonverbal signals at a tailgater on the highway, and attitudes toward risk.
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) conceptualized the Cultural Theory of Risk to explain the
role of culture on individual risk perception and behavior. The theory emphasizes the
process by which social organization and culture endow individuals with perceptions that
reinforce those structures in competition against newer alternatives. Accordingly, the
Cultural Theory of Risk asserts that culture and affiliated behavior can be characterized
by the group-grid scheme. A “high group” cultural way of life exhibits a high degree of
collective control, whereas a “low group” individual prides himself or herself on selfsufficiency. A “high grid” way of life is characterized by conspicuous and durable forms
of stratification in roles and authority, whereas a “low grid” one reflects a more
egalitarian position. Synthesis of the group-grid functions would produce expected fears
and risk attitudes. For instance, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) found that a “low grid,
high group” individual would have lower tolerance of environmental risk and actively
restrict commercial behavior productive of inequality. Conversely, a “low group, high
grid” would fear anarchy and lack of social structure.
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Specifically, collectivism and individualism have a definitive impact on how
peoples view and react to risk. Dake (1991) corroborates Douglas and Wildavsky (1982)
to stress that individuals choose what to fear in order to support their way of life,
resulting in a selective attending to certain kind of dangers. For instance, collectivists
would fear attacks on the prevalent norms, whereas individualists would loathe
shakedowns of free enterprise (Dake, 1991). Adherence to a certain tradition of social
relationships generates a unique way of looking at the world, and this deeply held
worldview legitimizes a corresponding type of appraisal (Dake, 1991). Individuals, not
cultures, assess and respond to risk. However, their culture provides a collectively held
set of customs and meanings that are internalized by the individual, becoming part of his
or her personality and cognition. For case in point, Xiao and Wang (2009) found that
individual risk preferences were intimately related to both discrete personality traits and
cultural precedents. The transactions between risk appraisal and behavior are guided, in
many degrees, by the ethos of the source culture. Hence, culture is essentially an
orienting disposition toward risk at the individual and the collective level.

Early Studies on Cross-Cultural Differences in Risk Behavior
Research on cross-cultural risk taking began with early studies examining the
modes of decision-making and probability judgment. One of the consistent results
depicts overconfidence on the part of East Asian participants in probability studies
involving everyday scenarios (Yates, Lee, & Bush, 1997). Psychologists initially
attributed this brazen attitude toward risk to divergent modes of decision-making.
Specifically, they estimated the source to be the distinct cultural profiles of the
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participants. Weber and Hsee (2000) outlined a taxonomy of different modes of decisionmaking to contrast the collectivistic category-based decision making to the analytical
mode adopted by individualists. The usage of stereotypes, folk wisdom, and precedents
permeate decision-making processes of the collectivism society. By contrast,
individualistic societies more frequently utilize logical and rational processes such as
cost-benefit analysis, and SWOT analysis (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat).
Individualistic societies also regard decisions in a more discrete fashion, meaning that
they are less likely to base their current decision upon past outcomes (Nisbett, Peng, Choi,
& Norenzayan, 2001). Therefore, there is extensive research delineating the difference in
decision-making and systems of thought between East Asians and Western individuals.
Zhang (1992) proposed that the Chinese education system emphasizes student
compliance to established norms and models. As a result, cognitive processes depend
upon a role-based and case-based retrieval; expectations and establishment overrides
idiosyncrasy. Based on Zhang (1992)’s work, Yates and Lee (1996) later suggested that
the East Asian treatment of risk is unique in its reliance on folk wisdom-precedents,
which often corroborate collectivistic values such as family, harmony, and
interdependence (Yates and Lee, 1996).
In the late 1990’s, several researchers conducted more extensive international
sampling of risk attitudes and its antecedents. Slovic (1999) found that people with less
trust in social institutions harbored more negative affective response to risk, but it could
be offset by the boost in informal support from family and close networks. Bontempo et
al. (1997) found systematic national and cultural differences in people’s perception of
risky financial assets (riskiness appraisal of 0-100). Specifically, Bontempo found a
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persistent preference of collectivists to offer more money on the random gambles
involving hypothetical sums of money. Those coming from individualistic societies chose
to offer little for risky gambles and more frequently zero sums for the highly risky
scenarios. However, the study relied upon a small, insufficient sample and failed to
achieve statistical significance in their results.

The Impact of Culture on Risk Perception: Using Cultural Products
Despite its pragmatic appeal, cross-cultural differences in risk taking have not
received serious consideration in psychology research. Previous investigations failed to
distinguish cultural and situational factors that may impact risk appraisals. Instead, many
simply assumed that a nation-group was collectivistic or individualist. For instance, the
Bontempo et.al (1997) study did not conduct an examination into whether the Chinese
sample was collectivistic or that the American sample was individualist. These two
orientations are assumed with verification.
Researchers from the University of Chicago and Ohio State University sought to
elucidate the culture-risk relationship by studying cultural products, IndividualismCollectivism (IND-COL) scales, and realistic investment scenarios. Hsee and Weber
(1998) looked to cultural proverbs to determine a culture’s impact on risk. They proposed
that if national differences in some behavior are the consequence of longstanding
differences in cultural values rather than in current political economy, they should also be
reflected in cultural products such as proverbs. The authors studied the proverbs of three
cultures: China, Germany, and United States. According to an established measure of
collectivism, these cultures range from very collectivistic to highly individualistic,
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respectively (Hofstede, 1980). Proverbs were gathered from anthologies from each of
these three nations and rated by Chinese, German, and American raters in accord with
individualism and collectivism. A significantly higher proportion of Chinese and German
proverbs offered warnings against social risk, while the United States cultural products
focused on financial risk. Social risk is defined as the likelihood to damage an existing
relationship while financial risk involved a losing either material goods or money.
However, Chinese proverbs were rated as to be providing greater risk-taking advice than
both American and German proverbs. In addition, regardless of the cultural origin of the
proverb, Chinese raters perceived the same proverbs to provide greater risk-taking advice
than did American raters. However, this only applied to the domain of financial risks and
not for social risks. Hence, the proverbs reflect the fact that social concerns are rated as
equal to, and perhaps higher than financial or materialistic concerns in collectivist
cultures, but are of smaller significance to individualists. The pioneering research showed
that comparative analysis of cultural products can provide insight into underlying value
differences. In essence, the observed differences in risk-taking from the two cultures can
be at least partially derived from longstanding differences in cultural values, which are
reflected in their proverbs.

The Cushion Hypothesis
Hsee and Weber (1998) revisited the Markowitz (1959) normative theory of risk
to contrast the behavior Chinese, Polish, German, and American students when
confronted with risky investment options. Participants from these countries were shown a
series of investment scenarios each of which included probability, size of gains and losses,
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and the expected utility. They were given a hypothetical $20,000 to make an investment
decision. Responses included the WTP (willingness to pay) amount and a risk appraisal
R(X) of each scenario. The Chinese sample offered a significantly higher mean buying
price for the investment options, and they also rated the investments safer than all other
groups in the sample. In other words, the collectivistic group of participants (Chinese)
had a distinct risk perception and behavioral tendencies; for the same given risky scenario,
the Chinese chose to invest more and also perceived them to be safer than the
individualists.
Intrigued by the results, Hsee and Weber followed up in 1999 as they expanded
the study to include other domains of risk-taking and modified the risk scenarios (Hsee &
Weber, 1999). Traditionally, common intuition – as influenced by popular media – regard
Americans as the more adventurous and risk-seeking group. East Asians are more closely
associated with prudence, conservatism, and pragmatism in terms of financial matters. In
the first part the study, Hsee and Weber (1999) asked American and Chinese participants
to predict each other’s risk behavior. The results corroborated what they believe to be
common knowledge; both American and Chinese participants predicted that the
Americans would be more risk-seeking.
Hsee and Weber’s (1999) research expanded the domains of the risky scenarios to
include academic and health scenarios. The academic scenario involved writing a paper
on a provocative or conservative topic, and the health scenario addressed the choice
between a new and established flu drug. Financial risk options were also tweaked to
include only percentage changes and eliminated the exchange rate confusion from the
1998 study. In the results, Chinese participants again consistently chose riskier
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investments than the Americans. However, the financial scenarios found persistent,
audacious preferences by the Chinese sample; in the academic and health scenarios, there
were no statistically significant difference between the American and Chinese samples.
Hsee and Weber (1999) offered an astute conjecture to explain the persistent
investment behavior and risk perception of the Chinese participants. The cushion
hypothesis states that the collectivistic social fabric of Chinese communities mollifies the
financial risk experienced by its members. Essentially, if they are in need, the Chinese or
other members of collectivistic societies turn to their extended social network for support.
This support ranges from emotional comfort to substantial material and financial
assistance (Hsee & Weber, 1999). For instance, East Asian societies often do not
construct strict time limits on loans or contracts on repayment of dues; reciprocity is
loosely interpreted and may last forever (Triandis, 1997). Furthermore, the emphasis on
interdependence and survival of the group puts pressure on group members to help one in
need. Assuming the actual provision of assistance or the perception of this social
arrangement, the adverse aftermath of a risky monetary investment may be less severe to
Chinese than to Americans. Consequently, the collectivistic person may internalize such
ideas and both perceive and prefer risk differently than those coming from an
individualistic culture.
Based on the Cushion Hypothesis conjecture and the supporting research leading
up to this point, a deeper exploration of cross-cultural risk behavior requires a model that
tests collectivism-individualism prior to gathering appraisal and reaction to financial risk.
Subsequently, this model must also observe and detect whether the members of a socially
collectivist culture do take greater financial risk because they can afford to because of
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their culture. Thus, this investigation warrants the creation of the Cushion Hypothesis
Scale to account for the attributes of social networks’ insurance against potentially
catastrophic outcomes. The social network serves as a “cushion,” and the present study is
designed to answer the following questions: “Is the risk behavior and risk perception of
participants dependent upon whether they believe that their respective social network will
cushion their potential “fall”? What is the influence of Collectivism and Cushion on
investment behavior in terms of risk perception and monetary amount invested? In Figure
1, the research paradigm is illustrated.
Figure 1.
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Method
Participants
The participants were selected from 92 adults in the United States and the
People’s Republic of China. They ranged between the ages of 20 and 26. The mean age
of the sample was 23. There was approximately an equal representation from each nation
group, consisting of 52 Chinese and 40 American individuals. The American sample
belonged to an elite liberal arts college, while the Chinese sample belonged to two
prominent Chinese universities located in Beijing, China. The compensation provided
was a chance to win a $25 dollar Amazon gift card for each country. Given the academic
emphasis of the American college, its students were likely to be government, economics,
or psychology majors. They were also intensely involved in job search and important
career decisions.

Procedure
The study was divided into two parts. In the first portion, the participants
answered a series of questions on an internet survey system designed to test two
constructs. Each set of questions tested one particular construct of interest. In total, there
were 17 questions, apportioned in the following manner to respective titles of the
construct.
I. Individualism and Collectivism Scale [11 questions]
II. Social Cushion Hypothesis [6 questions]
In the second portion, the participants responded to questions about their perceptions and
reactions of the riskiness of a series of financial investment opportunities. Six scenarios
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were shown individually and separately. Each scenario had three potential outcomes,
with at least one possible gain and one possible loss. The probabilities of obtaining each
outcome were shown numerically. The participants saw each of the investment scenarios
in the same random order. When the participants had finished, they were thanked for their
participation.
Materials and Apparatus
The first measure was designed to measure the collectivistic and individualistic
tendencies of the participants were expressed through a selection of items created by the
researcher and a selection adapted from the Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and
Collectivism (INDCOL) scale constructed by Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, and Gelfand
(1995). Subjects responded to items on a 7-point scale: 1 = strongly disagree or never to
7 = strongly agree or always. The Cronbach alpha reliabilities for the Singelis et al. (1995)
scale was α=.73. The scale involved a series of statements expressing a personal belief,
opinion, or hypothetical situation. These statements mostly reflected themes in social
relationships, tasks, or appraisals of life. For example,
It annoys me when other people perform better than I do. (Individualism)
The basic unit of society is the group and relationships keep us together
(Collectivism)
The Cushion Hypothesis was proposed by Hsee and Weber (1999) to explain the
heightened likelihood of collectivistic individuals to engage in high risk financial
decisions. As no scale currently exists to test this hypothesis, the researcher in the present
study constructed a 6-question scale to test the likelihood of participants to receive
assistance in the wake of financial difficulty, i.e. Cushion (Hsee and Weber, 1999). The
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items were measured on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree or never to 7
= strongly agree or always. For example, If I need financial or material support, I can
count on my parents, friends, and relatives.
For a complete sample of the individualist-collectivist scales and Cushion
questions presented to the participants, please refer to the Appendix section. A summary
score was calculated for the Cushion Hypothesis by using the sample mean. The
individualism and collectivism scales also had a summary scale score via the calculation
of a sample mean for each nation group. Scores were also reverse-coded for the
Individualistic responses so that a high overall score indicated collectivism whereas a low
summary score indicated individualistic leanings.
After responding to questions about their individualist and collectivist tendencies
and the extent to which they believe that family would provide a financial “cushion”,
participants began the second part of the experiment in which they indicated how much
they would be willing to spend to participate in several different investment options. The
task was dedicated to observe the risk preferences and perception of the participants. The
participants were presented with a description of their task, which involved investing a
certain sum of money into a portfolio under professional management. They were told to
assume that they were investing their own money and that they currently had $20,000
available to make investments. For the Chinese sample, the dollar amount was converted
via the most recent Purchasing Power Parity evaluators to account for cross-national
differences in relative worth of the amount of funds (the amount was 70,000 RMB).
There were a total of 6 different scenarios, each with three different possible outcomes.
There was at least one profit outcome and one loss outcome as part of each scenario. The
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gain and loss were expressed in terms of a percentage of the amount of money that they
put forward. The probabilities of each respective outcome were provided, and the
participants were asked to enter a monetary amount equal to the maximum amount of
money they were willing to spend to participate in each investment. They were also asked
to give a risk appraisal of the safety, 1 = not safe at all to 10 = very safe.
A sample presentation of a scenario:
Investment
Option
1

Outcome

Probability

+ 3.5%
-5.3 %

0.79
0.20

-16.0%

0.01

Amount to
Pay

Safety
Appraisal

The participants saw the investment option presented with the outcome and probability
first. Following, they will be asked the following questions:
What is the maximum amount you would be willing to invest in the current given
opportunity? (If you wouldn’t invest in it at all, please say $0).
How safe is this investment? Please answer on a numerical rating scale ranging from 1
(not safe at all) to 10 (very safe)
For example, investment option one has a 79% chance to have a 3.5% gain on the
monetary amount entered. It also has a 20% chance of losing 5.3%, and a 1% chance to
have a larger loss of 16%. If a particular participant saw the investment as not risky, they
would give it a higher safety rating and a lower risk rating, which coincided with a larger
monetary input. The participants saw each of the 6 options in a randomized order.
Furthermore, the scenarios were shown in discrete fashion and in a different browser
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window for each individual scenario. Hence, the participants would think that they were
investing the sum in a fresh start for each scenario. A summary of the Willingness to Pay
(Amount to Pay) and Risk Appraisal was calculated for each national group by using the
sample mean for each nation group: American versus Chinese. For a complete table of
the six scenarios, please refer to the Appendix section at the end of the paper.

Hypothesis
The Chinese sample will have a higher cushion mean score, as well as a
collectivistic tendency on the INDCOL scale when compared with the American sample.
The two scores from the CUSHION and INDCOL would increase the mean overall
invested monetary amount and the risk safety appraisal. The Chinese, on average, would
rate each given scenario as safer and invest more money than the Americans.
Results
The unifying framework involved several dependent variables at different stages.
Means were calculated using independent sample T-test and repeated measure analysis of
variance (ANOVA). For all analyses, p<.05 was the standard for statistical significance.

Cultural Attitudes
Results on collectivism and cushion demonstrate significant cultural difference
across the two nationalities. Each participant responded to an 11-item IndividualismCollectivism (INDCOL) scale once, and proceeded to answer a subsequent 6-item
cushion scale. The scores from the INDCOL scale are referred to as the
COLLECTIVISM scores, since a higher score on the scale suggest collectivism and
lower for individualism. The mean scores for each nationality are shown in Table 1-a,
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which are formed by averages of the aggregate summation of each individual’s responses
to the scales. For instance, an American or Chinese participant can have a possible score
range of 11 to 77 for COLLECTIVISM and 7 – 42 for CUSHION; a lower score on both
scales would suggest individualism and low levels of the perception of family support. As
shown in Table 1-a, Chinese respondents report higher mean scores on both INDCOL
and CUSHION scales, indicating higher levels of collectivism and perceptions of family
support (p <0.01). This corroborates both the hypothesis and literature (Hofstede, 1980;
Triandis, 1993) that East Asian nations, particularly China, demonstrate divergent
cultural attitudes in comparison to American participants. The domains tested in the
scales involve mostly relationships, social norms, and individual identity.
Furthermore, CUSHION and COLLECTIVISM scores are strongly correlated
with each other, r(90) = .42, p < .001. This correlation supports the notion that the
cushion hypothesis and its tenets are significantly related to the overarching collectivistic
emphasis on social goal structure and maintenance of harmonious close relationships.

Table 1-a
Mean scores of INDCOL and CUSHION by Nationality
COLLECTIVISM (SD)

CUSHION (SD)

USA

41.87 (7.89)

24.97 (6.49)

CHINA

45.40 (6.83)

27.98 (6.10)
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Nationality was found to significantly predict collectivism, b = .24, F(1,90) = 5.27,
p <.05. It also predicted cushion, b = .23, F(1,90) = 5.19, p <.05, such that the Chinese
sample were more likely to answer in a collectivistic fashion for both the INDCOL scale
and the cushion scale. Thus, analysis found both a main effect for nationality as well as
its significance as a predictor of collectivism and family cushion.

Amount Invested and Risk Perception
Mean judgments of Amount Invested and risk safety perception for the two
nationalities across investment scenarios are shown in Table 1-b. The magnitude of
Amount Invested and judgments of safety differed significantly as a function of
nationality. Results for both monetary investment and risk safety appraisals are produced
via a repeated-measure of variance (ANOVA) across the 6 scenarios. The Chinese
sample, on average, chose to invest more on three of the scenarios (Greenhouse-Geisser
F (1, 90) = 12.33, p <.001). Chinese respondents also rated three scenarios as safer than
the American (Greenhouse-Geisser F(1,90) = 4.00, p <.001). It is also worth noting that
the largest discrepancies in terms of amount of money invested were located in the safest
scenarios, in particular, scenario 1, 2, and 5. For the three riskiest scenarios, the Chinese
did offer to pay more but the difference between the nationalities was not as pronounced.
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Table 1-b
Mean scores for Amount Invested and Risk Safety rating for six scenarios
Scenario

EV (Safety
Rank)

Nationality

Amount Invested
(SD)

Risk Safety
(SD)

1

20309 (1)

USA

9821.25
(6245.48)

7.02 (1.42)

China

5375.41
(3581.31)

6.19 (1.98)

USA

4250.00
(4437.20)

4.35 (2.10)

China

3742.76
(3168.02)

5.13 (2.02)

USA

3190.00
(3857.11)

3.45 (1.87)

China

3396.34
(3106.59)

4.46 (2.57)

USA

2071.25
(3843.90)

2.67 (2.34)

China

3330.34
(3352.70)

3.71 (2.80)

USA

6926.25
(6174.98)

5.17 (2.37)

China

3464.63
(3369.60)

4.50 (2.61)

USA

1737.50
(2269.47)

3.73 (2.00)

China

2278.46 (3245.06)

3.73 (2.83)

2

3

4

5

6

19932 (3)

19238.80 (5)

19594.00 (4)

19973.00 (2)

18772.00 (6)

The EV column displays the ranking of riskiness of the six scenarios based upon
evaluation of Expected Values. The Expected Value is calculated from using USD
$20,000 as a benchmark and multiplying it with the probabilities of gain and loss for the
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given scenario. For instance, scenario 1 has an EV of 20309 after taking into account of
its 79% probability of gaining 3.5%, 20% chance to lose 5.3%, and 1% of losing 16%
(20,000 X 0.79 x 1.035 + 20,000 x 0.20 x 0.947 + 20,000 x 0.84 x 0.01). Therefore, the
EV column gives us a view of the objective risk levels across the six discrete investment
options faced by the respondents.
Overall, perceived risk increased with the calculated Expected Value of the
scenarios. The scenarios were ranked in order of their riskiness based on their discrete
EVs, and this information is shown in column 2 and 3 of Table 1-c. To complement these
data, there was also a significant positive correlation between risk safety appraisal and the
amount of money invested in each of the scenarios (r(90) = .44, .37, .48,. 32, .44, .42,
respectively, p < .001). Both Chinese and American respondents invested more in the
options which they felt were safer, and invested less in perceived riskier options. This
finding corroborates the data on Expected Values in that amount invested and risk safety
progressively increased in accord with the ranking of Expected Values of the investment
scenarios. Furthermore, the correlation suggests that the participants took the test
seriously and carefully analyzed the investment scenarios.
However, there were significant differences between the two nationalities in the
amount of money invested and risk safety rating for each scenario. The repeated measure
ANOVA results precluded a pooling of the mean amount invested and risk safety ratings
for each nationality. There was no consistent national preference across all six scenarios
as expected; the Chinese only chose to invest more in the top three riskiest scenarios. In
terms of risk safety appraisal, they ranked just three of the scenarios as significantly safer
than the Americans.
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Model of Cultural Influence on Financial Decision-Making
The crux of the study sought to show the impact of culture on risk perception and
investment behavior. Particularly, the two cultural variables of COLLECTIVISM and
CUSHION were projected to positively predict amount invested and risk safety
perception. Unfortunately, both variables failed to achieve significance in predicting
amounted invested and risk safety perception (p > .05). However, Nationality was found
to be a significant predictor of the majority of risk safety ratings (p <.05 for four
scenarios) and marginally significant for two scenarios (p <.10).

Discussion
The study pursued an expansion of previous studies on cultural differences in risk
perception and behavior, in the sense that it specifically tested for the ability of cultural
traits to predict investment behavior – as a function of amount invested and risk safety
perception. Previous studies such as Hsee and Weber (1998; 1999) found significant
differences in the way respondents from China and United States perceived and reacted
to the risks of financial scenarios. China, a traditionally collectivistic culture as found by
cultural psychologists Triandis (1993; 1996) and Hofstede (1980), invested more money
in every given scenario than the Americans did. The results from this study support the
notion that that a culture’s location on the individualism-collectivism continuum
contribute to the risk preferences and perception of its members.
Results showed significant cultural differences among the Chinese and American
respondents on the COLLECTIVISM and CUSHION scales. Chinese respondents scored
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significantly higher than their American counterparts, and a corresponding linear
regression showed Nationality as a significant predictor of responses from the two scales.
Thus, these results expand upon the Hsee and Weber (1998; 1999) studies in that the
gathered Chinese sample consistently answered in a collectivistic fashion. The items on
the scales, such as Conformity to general social norms is necessary to maintain stability,
are designed to expose the participant’s attitude toward group goals, relationships, and
emphasis on social support. Findings from the first step of the model confirm the theory
that collectivists place a premium upon group identity and harmony. The American
sample demonstrated a consistent preference for personal achievement and less concern
for the presence of family and social support. While the Chinese participants tended to
think of groups as the basic unit of society, the Americans were more inclined to consider
the atomic individual as the pillar of society.
An interesting caveat was the low mean scores for both Chinese and American
respondents on the CUSHION scale; the mean scores suggest a slightly low perception of
family support for both Chinese and Americans. Methodological problems or changing
cultural attitudes may explain the low scores for both nationalities. These issues are
discussed later in the discussion.

Risk Perception and Amount Invested
The COLLECTIVISM and CUSHION variables failed to achieve statistical
significance in predicting risk safety perception and the amount invested. Nationality
achieved minimal significance for the amount invested, but had more success in
predicting risk safety (p <.05 for four scenarios, p <.10 for the rest). However, the key

Cross-Cultural Risk Behavior 36

statistical correlation between amount invested and risk safety appraisal suggest that the
majority of respondents in both nations and cultures were risk-averse. In effect, this
finding also confirms existing literature on the relationship between financial risk-taking
and perception. The average Chinese and American respondent can be classified as riskaverse in the traditional sense in their offering to pay less on average for riskier options
than for safer options (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).
Given that the differences in amount invested were associated with the observed
differences in risk perception, we can assume that the participants behaved like normal,
rational human thinkers. Therefore, the failure of COLLECTIVISM and CUSHION as
significant predictor variables requires further exploration. In this study, I focused on
only one of the determinants of risk perception and investment behavior: culture. Risk
appraisal and behavior are functions of multiple cognitive dimensions (Wildavsky &
Dake, 1990). Situational, cultural, and individual differences can all produce differences
in risk perception and preference. For instance, risk perception can be influenced by
outcome feedback, trust, expectations, and personality (Weber & Milliman, 1997 as cited
in Hsee & Weber, 1998). For example, personality could modify an individual’s
tolerance of loss-gain frameworks associated with the Kahneman and Tversky (1973)
model. In other words, whereas most individuals are risk-averse in gains and risk-seeking
in losses, variance in personality of individuals could alter the perception and reaction to
risk simultaneously or in sequential manner. Some individuals could rank the same given
risk, but because they are more tolerant of risk, they would invest more regardless of
cultural bias. Consequently, there is a strong possibility that individual variance in
personality among the Chinese and American samples may have affected investment
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decision and risk safety ratings independent of the COLLECTIVISM and CUSHION
predictors. A rapidly changing landscape in China may have played a significant
influence on the personalities of the Chinese sample.
The present study reported cultural differences as stable constructs within their
particular

Collectivism

or

Individualism

groups.

However,

collectivism

and

individualism can both take different forms at various parts of the world and in different
dosages. For instance, moderately individualistic individuals can be concerned with “the
community” and act in socially more responsible ways than many collectivists. It is
entirely possible that some collectivists may become mentally exhausted of always
gearing toward demanding group-norms and social arrangements (Traindis, McCusker,
and Hui, 1990). Moreover, it is important to remember that each culture may have its
own kind of collectivism or individualism. For instance, South Indian collectivism may
have much in common with Chinese collectivism, but also has unique Indian attributes.
Changing demographics and economic conditions could have a sizable impact on
levels of collectivism and individualism in a society. A persistent finding in cross-cultural
studies is the increase in some aspects of individualism as a society pushes toward a
Western mode of living and production. Affluence, social mobility, and
internationalization not only serve as antecedents of individualism, but can also expose
native individuals to more diverse portfolio of values. Of all nations in the past two
decades, none has experienced as rapid of a change in affluence and globalization as
China. Furthermore, the sample of Chinese participants is collected from elite national
universities in the capital of China; it is entirely probable that many of these Beijing
college students hold stronger individualistic views than some American respondents.
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Methodological Issues
Limitations to both the scales and investment scenarios may have contributed to
the failure of the model’s original predictions on amount invested and risk safety. The
extent and length of the COLLECTIVISM and CUSHION scales may have been
insufficient to truly detect the cultural biases of 92 respondents. Specifically, the
traditional measures of collectivism-individualism as abstracted by Triandis (1993)
included over 35 questions. The present study handpicked 11 questions from a stock of
about 50 questions on the concept, and the accurate measure of a complex construct such
as culture may require much more than a dozen questions. Concurrently, many of the
participants in the American sample knew the investigator personally. Their self-report
answers may have been affected by the pointed nature of some questions i.e. I do not
have much trust in my family members. In addition, the CUSHION scale was entirely
novel and abstracted for the current research. As such, the reliability and validity of this
scale is yet to be extensively tested. In lieu of privacy concerns of the American sample,
which belonged to an intimate-sized liberal arts college, the CUSHION scale must be
more sensitive to its test environment and somewhat temper the provocative questions
regarding friends and family. Financial investment scenarios often required explanation
and should receive a makeover for future research in financial risk decisions. Several
participants complained that they felt none of the six scenarios were actually profitable or
desirable investments. In actuality, the expected values of the six scenarios only yielded
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one positive gain (with 20,000 dollars as the benchmark input). Hence, this may explain
as to why the amount invested did not have significance reaction to any of the projected
predictor variables.
The design to accommodate the exchange rate issue may have also affected the
Chinese participants’ investment decisions. Originally, the method was to employ
Purchasing Power Parity instead of the raw exchange rate calculation to abstract the
amount of hypothetical funds presented to the Chinese sample. Consequently, they were
told that they had only 70,000 RMB (PPP is currently around 3 RMB= 1 USD) as
opposed to 130,000 RMB (current FX rate stands at 6.5 RMB = 1 USD currency
exchange rate). The measure of PPP is not without controversy, however. Nusair (2003)
and Doganlar (2006) depict valid econometric concerns regarding both long-term
reliability and short-term validity of the PPP benchmark; fluctuations in tariffs and
government policies usually make PPP measurements less than ideal (Nusair, 2003).
Taking this into consideration, the amount of hypothetical money made available to the
two nationalities may have been imbalanced, resulting in an outcome where the Chinese
invested less money in the respective scenarios because they acted as if they had less
funds.

Implications for Future Research
Findings from the study confirm the general literature on cultural differences
between Chinese and Americans. The mean national scores on the two novel scales
demonstrate persistent preferences for certain types of social norms, relationships, and
family organizations exist among Chinese and American cohorts. In addition, the amount
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invested and risk safety results are partially explained by nationality; the Chinese sample
chose to take on more risk and perceived less risk for the three riskiest scenarios. This
confirms previous literature that found higher risk-tolerance and lower risk perception in
Chinese and collectivistic individuals.
It is not easy to establish whether observed national differences are truly
derivatives of culture. Despite the insignificance of the two culture scales as predictors,
future research should aspire to create additional items to the CUSHION scales and
expand the COLLECTIVISM scales. Complex concepts such as family trust and
relationship support systems may require much more in-depth measures to gather
accurate, significant responses. Furthermore, the weights we assign specific variables in
predicting psychological phenomena such as risk shift with the context, and culture is but
one of the contexts. The results from this study show that theories need to be
continuously tested, modified, and applied to a diverse population. Future research, for
instance, should continue to improve the validity of financial investment scenarios. A
more appropriate measure may start with abandoning raw dollar amounts and utilize
percentages. For instance, instead of asking participants to input a dollar amount to
reflect their risk preference and perception, they may be asked to answer: what
percentage of your current life savings might you be willing to put down for this
investment option? The risk levels of the scenarios also need to be modified so that there
are more discernible differences among the objective riskiness of the scenarios.
Risk perception and behavior are not static cognitive functions; they involve a
confluence of situational and cultural determinants. When a high-stakes cross-national
negotiation or major multinational takeovers are under consideration, the participants
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activate a multitude of analyses. Whereas culture – collectivism and individualism –
could strongly impact decision-making under risk, situational factors may also have
significance in shifting risk perception and behavior. While a partial replication of Hsee
and Weber (1998), the present study did not include situational determinants such as
mood and other personality traits. The model was already increasingly complex, and
inclusion of other variables causal in bringing about cross-national differences would
have impaired clarity. An ideal solution may be a set of studies, which may be best suited
to provide more conclusive evidence about factors that contribute to risk behavior. In
combination, model-based connections between various predictor variables should
discover more novelties regarding the influence of culture on risk (Hsee & Weber, 2000).
Cultures differ on many dimensions; individualism and collectivism make up only
one of those factors. Moreover, many cite the age-old wisdom in psychology that
intergroup differences are often less pronounced than intragroup differences. Americans
and Chinese may have more in common than they are different. However, the importance
of culture attributes’ influence on risk perception and behavior must not be delegated.
Differences on individualism-collectivism continuum have been used to explain
differences in social responsibility, career preferences, decision goals and methods of risk
adjustment, construction of the self, and judgment of performance (Hsee & Weber, 2000).
Despite the numerous methodological and exogenous variables encountered,
corrections to key steps can overcome such obstacles. In the immediate future,
modifications should produce a more rigorous cross-cultural investigation of risk
perception and behavior. For instance, the exploration of the role of cultural differences
in risk decision processes should expand into the effects of other cultural differences on
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value orientation. The format of future research can also shift; case studies, naturalistic
research, and lab experiments can form a more comprehensive set of studies dedicated to
examine cultural influence on risk. Translation of the surveys may also prove conductive
to more accurate research. The full potential of cross-cultural research in this realm has
not been fully realized, and I hope that this study will provide impetus for future research
in an important juncture between the two most important participants in the world of
tomorrow.
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Appendix
Items for the Measurement of Individualism and Collectivism (INDCOL)
**From Singelis et. al (1995)
**It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always

**It is dangerous to not consult close friends and get their ideas before making a decision.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always

I define myself in terms of my personal characteristics, independent from my
relationships with others.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always

**I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always

It is very important that I distinguish myself from my peers.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always

The basic unit of society is the group, not the individual.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly Disagree/Never

7
Strongly Agree/ Always

Conformity to general social norms is necessary to maintain stability in our lives.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always
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Generally speaking, I am suspicious of the “for the greater good” principle.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always
I ask about the scores of others on a test to confirm whether I scored better than them.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always

We should sacrifice for the greater good.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly Disagree/Never

6

7
Strongly Agree/ Always

I enjoy working in situations involving my unique input and novel contributions
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always

CUSHION Scale
I am confident that I have a financial safety net offered by my parents.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always
I find it difficult to place too much trust into my family members to rescue me if I run
into trouble.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always
My parents will ensure my financial stability as an adult.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly Disagree/Never

7
Strongly Agree/ Always

I am not a beneficiary of a wide range of family connections that could help me in times
of need.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always
I come from a large, extended family that is always looking out for its members.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree/Never
Strongly Agree/ Always
One shouldn’t let a close relative live worse off.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7
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Strongly Disagree/Never

Strongly Agree/ Always

The Investment Scenarios
Investment Expected
Option
Value (Rank)
1
20309 (1)

2

19932 (3)

3

19238.80 (5)

4

19594.00 (4)

5

19973.00 (2)

6

18772.00 (6)

Outcome

Probability

+ 3.5%
-5.3%
-16.0%
+4.0%
-1.5%
-13.5%
+19.3%
+3.4%
-16.5%
+55.0%
-11.0%
-8.0%
+12.0%
-1.5%
-48.0%
+0.8%
+4.5%
-20.0%

0.79
0.20
0.01
0.56
0.28
0.16
0.11
0.44
0.45
0.10
0.11
0.79
0.79
0.01
0.20
0.11
0.44
0.45

Amount to Pay

Safety
Appraisal

